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EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
THE 1976 GOP PRIMARY: FORD, REAGAN AND THE BATTLE
THAT TRANSFORMED POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS IN TEXAS
by Sean P. Cunningham
15
In the sixteen years prior to the 1976 election season, politics in Texas
was characterized by conservative ideology, as were voting trends at the local
level. Candidates with legitimate hopes of victory sought the conservative
label and vilified liberal opponents while conservative Democrats held the
Texas governorship and most senate and house positions. Yet national politics
was challenging this status quo and, consequently, the Texas Democratic Party
system grew all the more strained. Candidates from both political parties
gained favor with voters by embracing law and order and repudiating nation-
al social unrest, seemingly born on university campuses and effecting the lives
of conservative famihes across the country. The Democratic Party was leaning
left more consistently in its presidential nominations, and many Texans per-
ceived Republicans as viable conservative options in national races. As the
liberal wing of the Democratic Party assumed a more prominent national posi-
tion, Texas conservatives established not only a viable Republican Party but
also onc surging toward power. I
Ronald Reagan's popularity in Texas increased after his ftrst attempt at
the presidency in 1968. The former California governor's stance on big gov-
ernment and American values - loosely defined as Judeo-Christian, family
ethics coupled with individualism and a strict-constructionist view of the fed-
eral government's role in daily lives - brought support from Texas conserva-
tives regardless of party affiliation and provided a substantial base for the 1976
presidential race. Political stars like John Tower and John Connally played sig-
nificant roles in the fight for the GOP presidential nomination. Reagan's bid to
unseat incumbent President Gerald Ford further revealed the tremendous
strain within the Democratic Party, as well as a previously unseen schism in
the Texas GOP. Shifts in party affiliation resulted from reinvigorated conser-
vatism, especially among grassroots enthusiasts and fonner Goldwater sup-
porters. Established party leaders who failed to see the warning signs of
realignment were subject to replacement by newcomers who effectively
tapped into a brand of conservatism made more palatable by the style and per-
sona of Ronald Reagan.2
At the Republican state convention in August 1974, Tower and the rest of
the old guard GOP faction should have seen that their hold on Republican
operations in Texas was weakening. Despite a significant Texas presence in
the Ford administration, induding Houston business.man James Baker and
White House Chief of Staff Richard Cheney, convention delegates passed sev-
eral resolutions highly critical of Ford and his policies. Fifteen months later,
shortly after Reagan announced his candidacy, Houston Representative Ray
Barnhart and Midland MayoT Ernest Angelo, Jr., became co-chainnen of the
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Citizens for Reagan organization in Texas.
Reagan was given a boost when members of the Texas Legislature voted
to institute a presidential primary in Texas. Consequently, Reagan's hopes of
winning in Tex.as rested with the general public, not the state's established
GOP leadership. The legislature hoped that a presidential primary would
enhance Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen's chances of victory in the Democratic
race against Jimmy Carter. The split between liberal and conservative
Democratic party leaders had traditionally made the selection of delegates at
the state convention a difficult task. However, for Republicans, the new pri-
mary meant that established GOP leaders could no longer control the process,
as they would have in the traditional nominating convention. Instead, grass-
roots Reagan supporters made their voices heard in the primary campaign
rather than being ignored in the backroom politicking at a state convention. 1
The first ever presidential primary in Texas was scheduled for May 1,
1976. As that date drew closer, a number of individuals became active in shap-
ing the race. John Connally, for instance, was convinced that the GOP needed
to revamp its image both at the national and state levcL Americans had grown
increasingly disenchanted with the nation's chaotic atmosphere left over from
the previous decade. Nixon'5 Watergate scandal, coupled with the powerful
state Democratic organization, obstructed the Texas GOP's track toward main-
stream acceptance. 4
Connally argued that television advertisements could revamp the party's
image; they were "instant and dramatic," and could be as powerful as any
branch of the federal government. As a fonner Hollywood actor and General
Electric spokesman, Ronald Reagan was well prepared to utilize television to
appeal to conservative Democrats in Texas. His brand of new conservatism
stressed social issues such as opposition to abortion and gun control, support
for school prayer, and other issues not adopted by the traditional Texas GOP
leadership. 5.6
As the leaders of both parties braced themselves for the upcoming eJec-
tion, a number of issues emerged that illuminated subjects the Ford campaign
had hoped to avoid. In July 1975 the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that a 1971 desegregation plan adoptcd by the Dallas Independent School
District was inadequate. In order to comply with the new decision, Dallas
Judge William Taylor devised a new plan for the district. 7 On March 12, 1976,
district officials announced that more than 20,000 students would be bused to
satisfy the court's desegregation compliance program.~ As if Dallas conserva-
tives were not unhappy enough with these decisions, JudgeTaylor announced
that property tax.es would be increased to fund the busing program. Reagan
supported a constitutional amendment outlawing busing; Ford advocated lim-
ited federal intervention in elementary and secondary education, a softer
stance necessitated by his need to maintain the support of moderates in other
regions. During the early stages of the Texas primary campaign, Ford skirted
the issue of busing.') But he was unprepared when a San Antonio citizen ques-
tioned him about his administration's support for a $5,000 National Endow-
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ment for the Humanities grant, which the citizen claimed was being used in
part to fund a homosexual rights convention in San Antonio. 10
As the Texas primary approached, Ford was forced to adjust his positions
- or at least his words - to appeal to the heavy concentration of social conser-
vatives enamored with Reagan. But he appeared insincere to many voters
because his campaign rhetoric was rarely supported by action. 11 To complicate
matters further, Ford's campaign strategists consistently misread the relation-
ship between conservative Texa." Democrats and big business. The 1973 Arab
oil embargo had weakened the economy in some regions, but in Texas it had
been a catalyst for growth. Few Texans wanted to tamper with the good for-
tunes of oil barons. Nevertheless, Ford's strategists theorized that a majority
of Texans looked with disfavor upon big oil. This was not the only miscalcu-
lation made by the Ford campaign. The president and his advisors also failed
to capitalize on the shifting political climate of the state. Strategists dismissed
traditional economic conservatives as solidly Democratic - as had long been
the case - and made no plans to court crossover voters_ 12
President Ford's chief advisor in Texas was lohn Tower, who was
rumored to be seeking a cabinet appointment. The President paid little atten-
tion to Tower, however, except to encourage his pursuit of John Connally's
elusive endorsement. Connally consistently denied his own interest in the
GOP nomination but criticized the party ceaselessly and publicly. He repeat-
edly spoke of strengthening American business and patriotic resolve within the
party_ His refusal to support Ford enthusiastically may have given many
Texans the impression that the administration was merely a carry over of the
scandal-ridden Nixon administration. l3
Ford's campaign advisors researched Reagan's popularity even before the
fOlmer California governor announced his candidacy.14 In December 1975,
Ford campaign committee chairman Bo Calloway infonned his staff of some
potential problems with severallssues. Preliminary research showed the pres-
ident had potential weaknesses with conservative voters in his policy toward
the Soviet Union and the issue of detente. Furthermore, and somewhat more
disconcerting, Ford had an image problem; he was not perceived as "presi-
dential," hut only as a hand-picked successor to a failed and disgraced prede-
cessor. Ford's advisors also concluded that Reagan's support was "soft" at
best, based on the fact that over forty percent of his supporters were not very
knowledgeahle of his record in California. Fifty percent of them were not even
sure what they liked best about Reagan. 15 Reagan, however, was enjoying an
astonishing ninety-five percent name recognition factor, with a favorability
rating of fifty-four percent. Poll respondents saw Reagan as bolder, more deci-
sive, more straightforward, more competent, and stronger than Ford.lt.
As the Ford campaign began to shape its national strategy, the president's
appeal in Texas continued to dwindle. Ford wanted the public to view him as
both a different kind of Republican, unafraid to attack corporate America, and
a traditional GOP leader. This lack of a clear political identity hurt Ford in
Texas. Ford campaign strategists refused to believe that voters connected the
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GOP, support for big business, and economic growth. Chairman Calloway
went so far as to encourage Ford to sign the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act in December 1975. This bill imposed price controls on oil companies, a
regulatory measure that fostered bitterness toward the federal government
among oil interests l many of which had become reliable fundraisers for con-
servative politicians in Texas. Rising gasoline prices further turned public sen-
timent against Ford. The president calculated that Texans would find his anti-
corporate sentiments appealing. In reality, those with the power to influence
electoral outcomes were again alienated by the Ford administration. 17
According to Ford's internal polls, many Texans distrusted the Federal
Energy Administration, a symptom of a larger distrust of the federal govern-
ment. Ford's signing of a price roll-back bill, the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA), had not helped his popularity in Texas. Oil compa-
nies feared divestiture within their industry and embraced the philosophies of
Reagan, who opposed the new law fOT three reasons. First, he argued that it
would increase dependence on foreign oil sources. Second, he claimed that
price controls were a disincentive for domestic producers. And third, he argued
that controlled prices conflicted with any hopes for conservation, because
fixed prices encourage d greater consumption. 18 Late in April, Ford and his
advisors became aware that the bill would cost them considerable support in
Texas. However, some within the administration mistakenly believed that fal-
tering support was attributable only to the EPCA. In reality, Texas's emerging
conservative coalition consisted of social conservatives and religious leaders
as well as the oil magnates with distaste for regulatory policy.]~
At the same time, John Tower spent much of his time trying to curb
Reagan's growing popularity, which had been fostered mainly by the actions
of the Citizens for Reagan grassroots organization. Reagan, whose campaign
success stories in other state primaries to that point were few and far between l
began looking to Texas as key to his aspirations. In preparation for the Texas
campaign, he focused more attention on anti-government sentiment, aid to oil
businesses, and a corporate-friendly energy policy. Tower chose to pursue
Connally's endorsement while offering blanket dismissals of Reagan's criti-
cisms of the Ford administration. Although Ford consistently pursued
Connally's favor more fervently than did Reagan, both candidates sent
telegrams praising Connally's comments at a GOP fundraiser in Tarrant
County. Connally had lambasted the GOP for ethical lapses in Washington and
called on the party improve its morals through less intrusive government.
Meanwhile, Ford tried to diminish the legitimacy of Reagan's presidential
aspirations by intimating that Reagan was costing himself a chance at the vice-
presidency - implying that higher aspirations were improbable. Ford used
words like irresponsible and extreme when describing Reagan and his policies
toward the Soviet Union and the Panama Canal. The same tactics had crippled
Barry Goldwater's campaign in Texas twelve years earlier, and Ford hoped the
charges of extremism would stick to Reagan as well. 20
On March 24, Reagan upset Ford in the North Carolina primary, due in
large part to a series of diatribes painting Ford's plans to renegotiate America's
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defensive and territorial rights to the Panama Canal as a relinquishment of
"sovereign U.S. territory" against the consent of the public. Ford did not effec-
tively defend his stance on the issue in Texas until an interview on April 21, in
which he attacked Reagan's strategy as irresponsible. The President stated that
Reagan's actions would result in a war in which as many as 10,000 U.S. troops
would likely lose their lives. Additionally, Ford claimed that failing to negoti-
ate with the Panamanians would alienate relations with much of Latin
America. Despite this relatively vague defense, it was Ford's main offensive
effort to minimize the issue in Texas.21 In earlier trips to Texas, Ford had
tersely denied that he would ever relinquish sovereign United States territory.
In San Antonio on April 9 and 10, Ford limited his answers to questions on the
Panama Canal to two and three sentences. Reagan predictably pounced on
Ford's new stance, claiming it was merely a reaction to the public's renewed
interest in the issue.22
After losing in North Carolina, Ford's campaign staff place renewed
importance on the May I primary in Texas and announced a revamped sched-
ule that included more visits to the state. The President spent much of April 9
through 12 in San Antonio and Dallas. He returned during the last week of
April, visiting the Texas Panhandle, students at Texas Tech University in Lub-
bock, and business leaders in Abilene. Despite his efforts to appeal to Texas
conservatives, Ford never seemed to be accepted wholeheartedly. He never
convinced Texans that he was passionate about the issues they, and Reagan,
thought important. Ford's sincere interest in Texas was being questioned,
while Reagan appeared genuinely to enjoy his visits to the state. Reagan's
image as a Westerner and cowboy, advocating rugged individualism and pre-
senting frontiersman persona, was hardly mirrored by Ford's personality.2l
Ford largely avoided significant issues in Texas and continued to chase
his dream of a Connally endorsement most fervently. Connally refused to
endorse Ford, saying that their close personal friendship prevented him from
making an impartial decision on behalf of the Texas people. Reagan did not
rest his hopes in Texas on Connally's endorsement, at least not as strongly as
did Ford. Instead. he pursued crossover votes from conservative Democrats,
businessmen in the oil industry, and former Goldwater backers, all without
appearing to pander to any single constituency. Public perception of Reagan in
Texas was consistently positive; he was characterized as honest and, unlike
Ford. a straight-talker rather than a back-room politician.24
Reagan advertised and promoted his candidacy far more in Texas than did
Ford. The Ford campaign also had difficulty raising money in the state, while
Reagan's direct-mail fundraising operation was proficient,25 Ford's strategists
planned a five-minute, statewide speech to counter many of Reagan's allega-
tions, but the president's personal advisors urged Ford to remain above the
fray in the hopes that he might appear more "presidential." On April 9, the
Ford campaign, which had originally allocated $450,000 to advertising in the
Texas primary. reduced its promotions budget by $30,000.26
Reagan spoke with student leaders at Southern Methodist University on
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April 6 and was pleased to discover that they opposed the counter-culture
movement that had plagued the Reagan governorship in California during the
late 1960s.27 Reagan's confidence appealed to the growing number of youths
involved in state politics. During the final week of the campaign, Reagan
raised the issue of crime more often and accused Ford of treating the safety of
Texas' citizens as an afterthought. Hoping to quell such talk, the President
delivered a speech at Texas Stadium and announced a new "get tough on
crime" prevention policy_2~ After the speech, Ford appeared confident but
admitted that he would have to do some work to regain favor with oil con-
stituents due to his unpopular signing of the EPCA the previous December.29
Reagan successfully controlled the campaign against Ford by proactive-
ly pursuing his own agenda. Ford was often forced to defend his claim that
Soviet military spending had not made the United States a second-rate military
power by citing complex tonnage and firepower comparisons and arguing that
America's secure borders limited the need for increased military spending.
Presidential advisor David Gergen addressed some of these issues with Ford
during speechwriting sessions. However, while Gergen and Ford agreed to
touch on the issues Reagan raised, the Ford campaign team continued to
underestimate [he importance of foreign policy to Texans.30 Reagan did not
limit his criticism of Ford's foreign policy to the Soviet Union. He also
brought relations with Angola and Cuba to the public's attention, and attacked
Ford on detente and alleged poor leadership from Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger.J'
Ford added to his troubles with a poorly worded phrase during a speech
on the campus of West Texas State University in Canyon. In reference to his
personal political philosophy, Ford said, "any government big enough to give
you everything you want is big enough to take away everything you have."12
Clearly, this was an attempt to convince the public that he, and not Reagan,
was the candidate of smaller government and more local control.
Unfortunately, the public perceived Ford as the leader of just such an intrusive
government. 3] Reagan continued to pressure Ford on issues such as the nation-
al debt, increased intlation, and government interference in various social
issues. With the American public exhausted by a decade of war and scandal,
Reagan captured the anti-government, anti-establishment sentiment and
turned it into a platfonn that later became the basis of his presidency.34
Reagan's popularity grew in part because of his constant appearances at
GOP fundraisers. Despite increased spending by Ford, Reagan outspent the
president by a substantial margin.35 By April 14, Reagan's appearances around
the state were out-drawing Ford's, and the number of issues Reagan discussed
expanded proportionately. Once again, the Panama Canal became a hot topic,
despite Tower's insistence that Reagan was misinterpreting Ford's intentions.
Reagan also began targeting conservatives in both parties more specifically.
He spoke frequently about the need to put God back in public schools. and crit-
icized research grants to institutions of higher education; he addressed crime
prevention and attacked Ford on busing and energy_ Reagan's Texas campaign
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became an all-encompassing conservative platform with broad support.
Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter's decision to withdraw resources from
Texas in mid-April further advanced Reagan's cause in the state. Without a
noticeable Democratic campaign (Carter expected to carry the state by twenty
points), Texas Democrats became a more legitimate crossover threat. J6
The potential for George Wallace to siphon votes from Reagan's more
right wing followers seemed less credible after both candidates held rallies in
Fort Worth on April 15. Reagan drew 3000 supporters for his speech at Burnett
Park in the city's central business district, ten times the number Wallace
attracted later that day. Reagan was reported to be "poised and confident" and
attacked Ford's lack of attention to busing programs and school prayer.
Meanwhile, John Connally spent April 16 denying reports that he had been
offered the position of Secretary of State in exchange for endorsing Ford. The
incumbent president clearly remained on the defensive, without a legitimate
presence in Texas and only a shred of hope that a Connally endorsement would
tum things around.)?
Internal polls encouraged Ford to push for high voter turnout, clearly mis-
reading the potential crossover voters for Reagan. Ford's advisors largely
ignored this threat of conservative Democrats while overestimating the sup-
port of traditional, less conservative Republicans who had moved South dur-
ing the oil boom. 38 They believed that relocated northern Republicans would
balance any crossover vote. Pollsters assured the president as late as April 15
that he would win the Texas primary by a margin of anywhere between five
and fourteen percent.-19 In fact, polls showed Ford as the more popular candi-
date in Texas among every demographic group except the thirty-five-to-fifty-
four-year age bracket and those with incomes under $5,000. Ford's campaign
strategists further interpreted the president's seventy-two percent job approval
rating (among Republican voters only) as a positive sign. In reality, twenty-
eight percent of Republicans in Texas disapproved of Ford's performance,
while between seventy-two and eighty-two percent held favorable opinions of
Reagan. And while polls showed Ford leading among all demographic groups
save the two mentioned above, they also revealed that Reagan was perceived
as the more competent candidate on all issues except foreign policy. Ford's
inability to seize upon this strength, instead allowing Reagan to control debate
on defense issues, was another miscalculation by the president's campaign.4tl
Ford desperately spent campaign dollars during the final week of the
Texas primary campaign. Outspending Reagan $200,000 to $75,000, Ford pre-
dicted that the "New Texans" who had flocked to the Sunbelt during the oil
boom would relate to his brand of conservatism. At the same time, First Lady
Betty Ford commented to the press that a loss in Texa.<; was not a "killer" and
could be overcome. The perception grew that Ford was failing to identify with
Texas conservatives, both of the social and fiscal persuasion. The campaign
appeared to be mired in a defeatist attitude.41
The Ford campaign also devoted a significant amount of time and effort
to filing complaints and making allegations against Reagan's campaign oper-
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ations in Texas. The Texas Citizens for Reagan organization, listed as
Reagan's official campaign committee in Texas, was limited by federal cam-
paign regulations regarding fundraising and soft money. Another group, called
Delegates for Reagan, a self-proclaimed independent support organization, did
not fall under the same guidelines. As advertising dollars from the Delegates
for Reagan increased, far outweighing regulated spending reported by the
Texas Citizens for Reagan, Ford campaign representatives began to file
exhaustive complaints. These objections against Reagan's organization in
Texas began as early as February 1976 when Ford's staff challenged the pub-
lication and distribution of statewide Ronald Reagan newsletters, the compila-
tion of GOP voter lists, and the use of congressional district offices as cam-
paign offices.42 Evidence of collusion, such as both groups using the same let-
terhead, was present. Somewhat inexplicably, however, few repercussions
resulted. In fact, perhaps the only consequence of the filing of complaints was
the distraction of the issue itself, which better served Reagan than Ford.43
Before May I, the Reagan bandwagon gained more national followers
with the addition of convention delegates from South Carolina and Missouri.
A poll showed that Oklahoma's delegates would soon be pledged to Reagan as
well. Tower tried to use Reagan's Panama Canal issue against him and warned
Texas voters that a Reagan nomination would be like handing the Democrats
the White House come November. At that point, Tower queried, "Who knows
what would be given away?" Despite Ford's outspending of Reagan during the
final weeks of the campaign, pro-Reagan advertisements, purchased by vari-
ous independent political action groups, continued to appear in newspapers
and television stations across the state.44 Throughout the campaign, Ford chal-
lenged Reagan's experience and approach to important issues. He claimed that
Reagan offered overly simple solutions to complex problems. This argument
failed to convince Texans who related to Reagan's straight-talk approach. Ford
ended his campaign in the conservative districts of Lubbock and Abilene, men-
tioning a personal friendship with conservative Democrat and longtime repre-
sentative from the 19th Congressional district, George Mahon of Lubbock.45
Vote totals on May 1 validated what political observers already knew:
Reagan had overwhelmingly defeated Ford in Texas. The final percentages
gave Reagan a sixty-seven percent to thirty-three percent victory. Although
initial reports suggested that Ford had won Raines County, one of the few in
which the voting had been close, tabulations over the next three days con-
firmed that Reagan had swept the entire state.46 Tower criticized voters for
blindly accepting Reagan's inaccurate descriptions of Ford's policies and dis-
missed the victorious Reagan as a "bombastic preacher" who used "hard-lin-
ing cliches. parables and jokes" to captivate a personality-starved constituen-
cy_ Pre-election calculations had determined that a Republican voter turnout of
more than 175,000 would be impossible without a heavy crossover vote. With
more than 464,000 votes cast in the GOP primary, Reagan's influence had
clearly been felt across party lines and drastically altered the way future pri-
mary campaigns and general eJections were conducted in Texas. Reagan's cer-
tified margin of victory was 310,381 to 152,022 (2,329 uncommitted votes). A
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post-election analysis showed that even without any crossover votes from con-
servative Democrats, Reagan would still have taken the state by some 58,000
votes.47
Tower's credibility and popularity with Texas voters also took a massive
hit as a result of Ford's primary defeat. In the weeks following the contest,
rumors circulated that Tower's sole motivation in working with Ford was to
gain minority leadership status in the Senate. Additionally, the now embattled
Tower faced hostility and animosity from many within the Texas GOP leader-
ship. As the state convention approached in June, it was clear that Tower
would not be invited to take a seat in the Texat; delegation at the Republican
National Convention in Kansas City.4~
Reagan continued to gain momentum in the weeks following the Texas
primary, and captured enough delegates in Indiana, Georgia, and Arizona to
claim a lead over Ford. Texas Governor Dolph Briscoe announced his support
for Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter in mid-May, although his enthusiasm
was tempered by Carter's selection of liberal Minnesota Senator Walter
Mondale as running mate. Other developments in May included the release of
a statewide poll indicating that a John Connally endorsement would not have
had any bearing on the outcome of the GOP primary. In fact, the random ~am­
pIe showed that while thirty-four percent claimed that a Connally endorsement
would have made them more likely to vote for a particular candidate l thirty-
eight percent claimed that it would have had the opposite effect. Polls in April
showed that the Connally endorsement would have resulted in a twenty-nine
percent increase in Ford's vote total.49
Political pundits also claimed that, on a national level, Ford never fully
managed to embrace the advantages of his incumbency. Rather, the president
struggled to convince voters that he was a legitimate president and deserved
the office on his own merits. To conservatives in Texas, Reagan represented a
new beginning and an end to the chaos that had plagued the United States in
domestic and foreign policy for a decade. By mid-May, some within the Ford
administration were on the verge of panic. Reagan was clearly controlling the
issues of the campaign. Ford's responses were not only inadequate, but had
reduced the president to a mere candidate rather than the incumbent.5o
For Texans, the 1976 presidential primary was a landmark political event.
The viability of Republican candidates at the local level was forever altered as
a result of the decisive Reagan victory. By 1980, marginalized leaders such as
John Tower were forced to embrace a new conservative agenda, not because
Texans altered their collective political ideology but because Reagan's brand
of Republicanism more accurately reflected the with deeply rooted conserva-
tive beliefs about the size and scope of the federal government. Reagan did not
cause the partisan realignment experienced in Texas between 1976 and 1984,
but he and the candidates who adopted his philosophies, especially in the way
of campaign strategy, benefited most from the shift. Texas voters began voting
Republican in larger numbers during the 1970s and 1980s, not just in presi-
dential races but in state and local elections as well. Reagan's victory in 1976
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made the GOP fashionable in Texas, and resulted in legitimate political com-
petition for the first time since Reconstruction.
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